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CASE NOTES
Trade Regulation—Robinson-Patman Act—Manufacturer's Pricing of
Autos at Close of Model Year.—Valley Plymouth v. Studebaker -Packard
Corp.'—This is an action for treble damages brought by an automobile dealer
against a manufacturer and another competing dealer for asserted price dis-
crimination in violation of Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act? The
manufacturer, Studebaker, sold 66 of its 1960 model cars to plaintiff, Valley
Plymouth, from January 7 to July 11, 1960. Due to unexpectedly poor sales
between March and July of that year, Studebaker was faced with an unu-
sually large inventory of 1960 model cars for the months of October through
December, the very period when the 1961 models were being introduced.
Despite announced monthly reductions in price to all its dealers, the manu-
facturer was not able to reduce this inventory. On December 31, 1960, a
special sales agreement for 418 cars was reached between the defendant-
manufacturer and defendant-dealer, Ranchero. The prices were not only con-
siderably lower than those paid by the plaintiff at any time during that year,
but also were lower than any price ever offered to it. The plaintiff contended
that this lower price to a competing dealer was discriminatory as against
him. HELD: The plaintiff could not claim injury within purview of the
statute even though the automobile might be considered to be of "like grade
and quality." These were not analogous transactions made under comparable
conditions at the same time. Furthermore, the circumstances of this case,
namely, a normal change in automobile model, made in good faith, came
within the "changing condition" exception of Section 2(a).
The questions before the court were whether by these transactions the
manufacturer did "discriminate in price between different purchasers of com-
modities of like grade and quality .. ." within the meaning of Section 2(a)
of the Robinson-Patman Act, 3 and whether such alleged discriminations in
price were "in response to changing conditions affecting the market for or
marketability of the goods concerned . . ." and thereby within the exception
of the Fourth Proviso of Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act.*
In determining whether the defendants were guilty of price discrimina-
tion, the court felt it necessary to consider the sales to Valley Plymouth
during the first seven months of 1960 and the sale to Ranchero on Decem-
ber 31, 1960. It treated the plaintiff's claim as relying upon the actual
differences in price between that paid by it to Studebaker and the amount
agreed upon between the two defendants nearly six months later, although
it was expressed that the plaintiff's allegations were not based upon Stude-
baker's dealer-wide reductions in price of its 1960 models following the in-
troduction of the newer models.
For the provisions of the Act to be applicable, a plaintiff must be able
to establish that the discrimination in price arose over goods of "like grade
and quality." This is a crucial requirement to meet, as it is obvious that if
the commodities to be sold are not "like", the price at which they are sold
need not be the same. Congress left the precise meaning of "commodities
1 219 F. Supp. 608 (S.D. Cal. 1963).
2 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C.	 13(a) (1958).
8 Ibid.
Ibid.
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of like grade and quality" open to the courts, and the result has been a
relatively few decisions, which are confusing and conflicting in their con-
clusions. 5
 The Attorney General's Report has taken the view that "the `like
grade and quality' concept ... was designed to serve as one of the necessary
rough guides for separating out those commercial transactions insufficiently
comparable for price regulation by the statute."6
 This view has been speci-
fically supported in at least one decision,' and the theory has obviously been
followed in another. 8
While the meeting of the "like grade and quality" requirement is essen-
tial to a § 2(a) case, a surface satisfaction of this clause does not end the
statutory test for the fulfillment of this prima facie element.° So it was evi-
denced by the court in this case when it stated that "although the cars
involved may be considered of like grade and quality . . . there was not a
failure . . . to give fair and equal treatment to plaintiff . . . ." 1° Therefore,
other circumstances of this case, particularly the time interval between
transactions during which period the 1961 models were introduced and the
resulting depreciation in value of the older styles, were the bases of the
court's determination that there was no violation of the Act's prohibitions.
Due to the automatic lessening in value of the older models upon introduction
of the newer ones and the decrease in consumer demand for the out-dated
cars, it is felt that the court realistically and justifiably decided the plain-
tiff could not claim any discrimination under the statute arising out of
differences in price paid by it and the defendant-dealer. 11 These factors of
time and demand no doubt affected the relative value and pricing of the
cars at the different purchase dates. Thus, even though the commodities
involved could be classified as "like", it would have been imprudent for
the court to treat these two business dealings as "consummated contempo-
raneous sales transactions" demanding like treatment by Studebaker.
Once the court decided that the plaintiff claimed no violation within
the scope of section 2(a) of the statute, it need not have concerned itself
5 Boss Mfg. Co. v. Payne Glove Co., 71 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1934) (actual physical
composition of commodities examined) ; Bruce's Juices v American Can Co., 87 F. Supp.
985 (S.D. Fla. 1949), aff'd, 187 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1951) (comparing items as to their
functional interchangeability); United States Rubber Co., 46 F.T.C. 998, 1006-09 (1950),
and United States Rubber Co., 28 F.T.C. 1489, 1500 (1939) (dismissing problems of
brand advertisement differentials).
6 The Att'y Gen's Nat. Committee to Study the Anti-Trust Laws 157 (1955).
7 Moog Indus. v. FTC, 238 F.2d 43 (8th Cir. 1956).
8 Atlanta Trading Corp. v. FTC, 258 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1958).
Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act 45 (1962).
[I]f any one of the jurisdictional elements does not appear, the substantive
prohibitions of the statute cannot come into play.
The jurisdictional determination turns on these basic statutory requirements: a dis-
crimination . must arise from (A) consummated contemporaneous sales transactions (B)
by the same seller to different purchasers, (C) involve "commodities" of (D) "like grade
and quality," and (E) occur "in commerce."
19 Supra note 1, at 610.
11 In support of their position the court quoted from the Atty. Gen's Rep. "The
prohibitions of the statute presuppose discriminatory treatment of customers in analo-
gous transactions involving similar goods under comparable market conditions at
approximately the same time." Supra note 6, at 178.
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with Studebaker's contention of the "changing condition" proviso, as this
proviso is a matter of affirmative defense to a party charged with price dis-
crimination. The proviso represents an exception to what would otherwise be
an unlawful discrimination arising out of a seller's price variations in analo-
gous and concurrent transactions. 12 The two usual statutory defenses are
the cost justification proviso 13 and the meeting competition proviso." It
has been expressed that it is doubtful whether the "changing markets" pro-
viso will ever have any substance or applicability,' 5 and it has been re-
ferred to as "an unchartered legal frontier."16 Perhaps, it was a desire to
pave a judicial path that led the court to include a discussion of the issue.
As to the purpose of the "changing condition" proviso the view has
been taken that:
Congress tried to assure that a seller's pricing might without risk
of illegality respond readily to quickly unfolding market events,
even though this prejudiced some rival buyers who purchased
almost simultaneously in equivalent commercial circumstances but
at a higher price which preceded the "change.""
The rationale of this proviso is only valid when the price variation is in
response to "a competitive situation not of the seller's own making." 18
Hence, it has been said, only when
the "changing condition" affecting the market for the seller's pro-
ducts is an objective external market change genuinely motivating
the price variation, the proviso could come into play to exonerate
the price.'°
Faced with a case of first impression in defining a "changing condition
affecting the market" based on "obsolescence of seasonal goods" the court
made a very practical interpretation of both words, "obsolescence" and
"seasonal." The application of the facts of this case to the meanings pro-
vided by the court should not cause serious objection.
A more arguable drawback to the court's declaration might appear by
its disregard of the clause's fore-mentioned presupposition that the situation
not be of the "seller's own making." A rejection of this requirement would
make it possible for each seller to create and control the very "changed
condition" necessary to legalize its price discrimination. While not benefiting
this plaintiff, such an objection to the application of the proviso continues
to be relevant to any treatment of it. The court did concern itself with this
12 See supra note 6, at 178, and supra note 9, at 322.
13 Supra note 2.
14 Ibid.
is Barton, Defenses in Price Discrimination, 17 A.B.A. Antitriist Section 390 (1960).
13 Rowe, supra note 9, at 322.
11 Supra note 6, at 178.
38 American Motor Specialties Co. v. FTC, 278 F.2d 225, 226 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 884 (1960). Cf., supra note 1, at 613 which rejects the application of
this argument.
19 Rowe, supra note 9, at 329.
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problem" and relied heavily on the particular facts presented and the ap-
parent good faith of the sellers to negate the possibility of such a self-created
"changing condition."
Another problem, alluded to earlier, is this court's treatment of the case
as if the plaintiff's allegations were based only upon the differences in price
paid by it and defendant-dealer. A reading of the case indicates that the
plaintiff was actually claiming a price discrimination due to the price paid
by the defendant-dealer and that such a similar special arrangement was not
offered to it as a competing dealer. This issue becomes conspicuous by the
complete disregard of it in the discussion of the case. Perhaps the court
felt the act itself precluded explicitly setting aside this contention. 21 There
are also many cases which give support to the well-established position
that no actionable price discrimination can arise unless there is a discrimina-
tion "between different purchasers." This simply means that two transactions
must be completed in order to violate this statute.22
The inapplicability of the Robinson-Patman Act to "refusals to deal"
has been confirmed by a leading interpretation of the Act by the Federal
Trade Commission 22 However, in the circumstances of this case, Studebaker
had chosen plaintiff as a customer by accepting it as a dealer and was still
very much agreeing to deal with it by continuing offers of additional reduc-
tions in price. It must be further noted that this was occurring at the time
when the special agreement was made with the defendant-dealer. Therefore,
this was not simply a case of a seller's "refusal to deal" as used above;
neither was it a denial to select a customer as is allowed by the statute.
Although other remedies may be available,24 it would appear that for
the plaintiff to come within the literal language of this Act it must have made
an actual and current purchase at a price higher than that paid by the de-
fendant-dealer. It is not denied that Valley Plymouth did not meet this
element, but it is suggested that this requirement should not be applied in
the special circumstances of this case To require the plaintiff to enter a sales
20 This should be evident from the court's statement that "obviously there was
no intention of manufacturing the cars, which turned out to be excess, for off-season
sale and it appears to the court that their manufacturer was in good faith . . .." Supra
note 1, at 613.
21 Supra note 2. Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act provides that "nothing
herein contained shall prevent persons engaged in selling goods, wares, or merchandise
in commerce from selecting their own customers in bona fide transactions...."
22 Chicago Sugar Co. v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 176 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1949) ;
Shaw's Inc. v. Wilson-Jones Co., 105 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1939); Naifeh v. Ronson Art
Metal Works, 117 F. Supp. 690 (W.D. Okla. 1953), aff'd, 218 F.2d 202 (10th Cir. 1954).
28 Bird & Son, Inc., 25 F.T.C. 548, 553 (1937).
(Si() the act does not purport to interfere with the right of a seller to select his
customers. He may discriminate in the choice of his customers. Not until there is
a discrimination in price among those chosen does Section 2(a) of the act have
any application.
24 Supra note 6, at 133.
[T]he validity of any refusal to deal may depend on the Sherman Act's pro-
hibitions on contracts, monopolization and combinations in restraint of trade;
the Clayton Act's control on price discriminations and exclusive arrangements;
as well as the general ban on "unfair methods of competition" in Section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act.
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agreement with Studebaker at an unprofitable price, when on the surface
it appears that neither a business benefit nor a possible price discrimination
in violation of the Robinson-Patman Act can thereby result, seems entirely
unreasonable. Thus, when dealer-wide offers continued and where there was an
implication of a secret dealing between the defendants, such facts provide
an instance where the requirement of actual purchase should be waived 2 6
Rather, it is suggested that the plaintiff need only establish that it would
have become a purchaser at the special lower price offered to its competitor.
THOMAS HUGH TRIMARCO
Uniform Commercial Code—Products Liability—Requirement of Priv-
ity in the Breach of Warranties.—Wilson v. American Chain El Cable
Co. 1—Action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by the plain-
tiff when thrown from a rotary lawn mower into the path of its revolving
blade, as the machine came to a sudden stop when striking an incline. The
machine was manufactured by the defendant and had been purchased from
a local dealer by the plaintiff's father. Separate theories of liability were
pleaded and bottomed on the alleged negligence of and breach of warranty
by the manufacturer. It was not specified whether the warranties allegedly
breached were express or implied. The defendant moved to dismiss the
action as to breach of warranty on the ground that there was no privity
of contract between the defendant and the injured party. The plaintiff
moved to strike, asserting that in Pennsylvania a lack of privity is not a
defense to a suit by a subpurchaser or members of his family against a
manufacturer on breach of warranty principles. HELD: The defense of
lack of privity could not, under Pennsylvania law, be stricken, where there
was no showing as to whether the warranty was implied or express, and
where no showing had been made as to whether the manufacturer had in-
tended either an express or implied warranty to flow through the conduit
of a contractual chain to a subpurchaser and his family.
The Uniform Commercial Code states that a seller2 impliedly war-
25 It has been held that it was not necessary for a customer to make a purchase
at the discriminatory higher price: "in order to attain the status of a competing pur-
chaser under the Act, as its failure to do so was directly attributable to defendant's own
discriminatory practice." American Can Co. v. Bruce's Juices Inc., 187 F.2d 919 (5th
Cir. 1951).
1 216 F. Supp. 32 (ED. Pa. 1963).
2 Section 2-103 of the UCC defines "seller" as "a person who sells or contracts
to sell goods." However, it would appear that this definition is broad enough to
encompass suits against the manufacturer, even though he is not the immediate seller.
Professor Del Duca in his article Extension of Warranty Protection Under Section 2-318,
appearing in the B.C. U.C.C. CO-ORD (1963) 415, suggests: "In sustaining the son's
cause of action against the manufacturer, the court could have ruled that since the
purchaser-father had warranty protection against the manufacturer this warranty pro-
tection also extended to the beneficiary-son by virtue of Section 2-318." (Emphasis
supplied.) The case under analysis was Allen v. Savage Arms Corp., 52 Luz. L. Reg.
R. 159 (Pa. 1962). Thus one is confronted with a manufacturer, a wholesaler and a
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